Abstract In a median-voter framework with pensions and immigration we show that only few unskilled immigrants are allowed into the country because the unskilled native median voter is concerned with negative effects on his or her wage, but not with the positive effects to other groups in society. When return migration is allowed for, the median voter is more willing to accept immigration because he or she can shift some of the burden to future generations.
Introduction
In most Western countries, the ageing of societies imposes a major challenge to welfare systems, in particular to unfunded or pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) pension systems. There is a need for pension reforms-such as increasing contributions and retirement age or lowering benefits-which are, however, usually highly unpopular among voters. It may therefore appear as a less problematic solution to allow additional contributors to the pension system into the country. Given that these immigrants have children, they not only pay contributions but also cause little additional cost because their children will later contribute to the pension system and thus pay for their parents' pension benefits. Based on this reasoning, Razin and Sadka (1999) argue that under certain conditions even immigration of net beneficiaries of the welfare system will lead to an unambiguous welfare gain to all generations in the host T. Krieger ( ) Department of Economics, University of Paderborn, Warburger Str. 100, 33098 Paderborn, Germany e-mail: tim.krieger@notes.uni-paderborn.de country. Our paper will explore whether this result still holds when today's living generations vote on immigration policy and what effects the possibility of return migration has on the voting outcome. Return migration is assumed to reduce the number of immigrants' children who continue to live (and work) in the host country. We will argue (i) that voters will prefer only a low level of (unskilled) immigration, but (ii) that the possibility of return migration will increase the preferred level of immigration.
Pension systems are sensitive to the growth rate of the labor force. Additional contributions allow either the lowering of contributions by all other members of the pension system or the raising of benefits.
1 Therefore, immigrants should be welcomed in ageing countries. When an immigrant's family, including all descendants, stays in the host country, i.e., when a 'dynasty' (Sinn 2001) is founded, there will in general be a sufficient number of children to cover their parents' pension benefits. Often immigrants have on average more offspring than natives, so natives benefit even more from immigration. According to Sinn (2001) an immigrant dynasty creates a benefit for the host-country's pension system equal to the gross total contribution of the initial immigrant. Note, however, that Razin and Sadka's (1999) encouraging result holds only under the condition that immigrants and their descendants stay in the host country for infinite time. This is a rather strong assumption, which-if relaxedmay change natives' preferences about immigration levels as well as the outcomes of voting decisions on immigration policy.
In fact, often immigrants move to a country not permanently, but only temporarily for a certain time period. Afterwards they return to their home countries. Return migration is not negligible (Dustmann 1996) . This is confirmed by Table 1 which shows the total number of non-native emigrants from selected EU-member countries. The absolute number of emigrants is particularly high in Germany, although it is still outnumbered by the number of immigrants, as the share of emigrants in the total number of immigrants shows. The latter has been large in Belgium and Italy in the 1980s and in Germany in the 1990s. Having presented these-very stylized-facts on return migration, it appears reasonable that return migration, which has not yet been considered in models on migration and pensions, 2 should be incorporated into this class of models.
Return migration may affect the pension system directly. During their stay in the host country temporary immigrants acquire pension claims which can eventually be transferred to their home country.
3 As a consequence, future contributors to the pension system have to come up with contributions for both native and returned retirees. As long as the returned immigrants' children stay in the host country, nothing changes compared to a situation without return migration. However, when some children return with their parents, contributions per native have to increase. The costs and benefits of immigration will be distributed unequally between generations, favoring those benefiting from initial immigration.
When the effects of immigration differ between generations or groups in society, a voting decision on immigration policy may reflect these differences. While in Razin and Sadka (1999) no generation is worse off, Razin and Sadka (2000) show that negative wage effects will harm young generations. This will lower the support for (unskilled) immigration.
1 Lacomba and Lagos (2005, 2007) suggest another channel explaining why new contributors may be beneficial for PAYGO pension system. They argue that the arrival of immigrants forces natives to delay their retirement; effective retirement age increases then. 2 See Krieger (2006) for a recent survey.
